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GLOBAL AIRLINE ALLIANCES-REACHING OUT TO
NEW GALAXIES IN A CHANGING COMPETITIVE
MARKET-THE STAR ALLIANCE & ONEWORLD
MICHAEL S. SIMONS*
This article examines the emergence of the Star Alliance Group headed by
United Airlines, which by adding Varig of South America as a partner in
late 1997, attained its objective of becoming the first global airline alli-
ance. Then, in July 1998 American Airlines and British Airways re-
ceived conditional approval to form their own alliance by the European
Union's Competition Commissioner. EU approval was subject to the sale
of a certain number of slots at London's Heathrow airport and the ap-
proval of a US- UK Open Skies agreement. In September 1998, oneworld,
headed by British Airways and American Airlines, (BA-AA) was
launched. This article seeks to examine the components of these new
global alliances, their strategic linkages with other airlines, and the char-
acteristics that make them dominant as the airline industry enters the new
millennium and beyond.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE ANNOUNCEMENT in late 1997 that the Brazilian car-
rier Varig Airlines, the largest airline in South America, had
joined the Star Alliance Group, created a strategic commercial
threat to its competitors and signaled to other alliance groups
that Star has the capacity to be the first truly global airline alli-
ance.' Launched officially in May 1998, U.S. authorities have
permitted the Star Alliance to proceed, though the European
Union Competition Commissioner intends to watch its activities
closely following complaints by corporate travel agents that the
alliance partners have failed to pass on price benefits to passen-
gers in Europe. The alliance partners in Star, which collectively
fly to more than 600 destinations in 108 countries, provide a
stellar challenge to other major carriers such as the oneworld
British Airways - American Airlines Group seeking to form simi-
lar alliances on a global scale. This article seeks to assess the
core components of each alliance, the features which have cre-
ated the competitive advantage the airlines currently enjoy, and
the challenges facing them over the next three years as they seek
dominance in a new world of global carriers in the new
millennium.
I For a general discussion of global airline alliances and their impact see United
Airlines Alliances, United Information Guide, HEMISPHERE, Nov. 1997, at 212; see also
Scott Kimpel, Antitrust Considerations in International Airline Alliances, 63 J. AIR L.
CoM. 475, 476-78 (1997); Michael S. Simons, Aviation Alliances: Implications for the
Qantas-BA Alliance in the Asia Pacific Region, 62J. AIR L. & CoM. 841, 843 (1997).
2 See Arkady Ostrovsky & Michael Skapinker, Travel Agents Accuse Star Airline
Alliance, FINANcIAL TIMES, November 5, 1997, at 6; see also Karen Walker AA/BA
Takes Another Step, AIRLINE Bus. Aug. 1998, at 10 (discussing the debate regarding
how much AA/BA should give up in order to gain EU support for its alliance).
Additionally, the Commissioner could insist that the Star Alliance give up slots in
the future. See Tom Gill BA/American Put Alliance Brakes On, AIRLINE Bus., Dec.
1998, at 9.
3 See Edwin Mc Dowell, Business Travel, NEW YoRK TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at D9.
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II. VARIG AIRLINES AND THE STAR ALLIANCE
Varig Airlines joined the key partners of the Star Alliance-
Air Canada, Luthansa, SAS, Thai International, and United Air-
lines-at a time when their nearest competitors, British Airways
and American Airlines, were attempting to gain the pre-eminent
position in global aviation. Varig Airlines has a fleet of eighty-
two jet aircraft, serves eighty-seven cities within Brazil and thirty-
five cities in twenty-three countries on four continents. The air-
line's publicity states that the Star Alliance is "a global air net-
work offering customers convenient world-wide service through
global recognition, coordinated schedules, one stop check-in
and the most convenient access to more than 600 destinations
worldwide."4 This initiative by the Star partners suggests their
main competitors, the BA-American Airlines Group, may find
themselves increasingly isolated from reaching their global
objectives unless the BA-AA Alliance gains full regulatory ap-
proval from the European Commission and the UK government
without delay.5
American Airlines also faces difficulties in maintaining a via-
ble service on some routes serviced by the Star Alliance. The
recently retired Chairman of American Airlines, Robert Cran-
dall, stated that his company is dwarfed by the Star Alliance,
which has $42 billion in annual revenue and serves 78,000 po-
tential city-pairs. BA-American Airlines', on the other hand, has
$27 billion in revenue and 36,000 city-pairs.6
At the time of this writing, British Airways and American Air-
lines had gained a preliminary ruling from the European Com-
mission granting approval to develop their commercial
relationship. This decision is subject to the BA-AA Alliance with-
drawing 267 slots at Heathrow airport and reducing frequencies
on major hub-to-hub routes over a six-month time period, in
addition to the general terms and conditions under which the
UK and US governments will proceed with the Bilateral
agreement. 7
4 United Airlines Alliances, HEMISPHERE, Nov. 1997, at 2; see also Michael A. Tav-
erna, VarigJoins Star Alliance as EUScutiny Intensifies, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 27, 1997, at 36.
5 See generally McDowell, supra note 3.
6 See Karen Walker, Hell for Leather, AIRLINE Bus., Aug. 1997, at 61.
7 See Walker, supra note 2, at 10; see also Roland Gribben, BA Told to Drop Flights
or End American Dea4 The DAILY TELEGRAPH, LONDON, Aug. 2 1997, at 23; Lois
Jones, 96 at a Glance, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1997, at 30; Tom Gill, The Devil's in the
Detail, AIRLINE Bus., Sept. 1998, at 76 -79; see generally Tom Gill, EC Faces Tussles
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III. THE STAR ALLIANCE PARTNERSHIP
The Star Alliance Group continues to extend its global reach
with new partnerships including Singapore Airlines of the Singa-
pore International Airlines (SIA) Group, Air-New Zealand (Air-
NZ), and Ansett Australia entering the alliance in March 1999.
These links are based on an extended code-sharing relationship
with twelve other carriers in the Asia Pacific Region.8 It is note-
worthy that United was the only North American carrier that
remained on the South Pacific route during the economic reces-
sion in the 1990's when American Airlines, Continental Airlines,
Pan-American Airlines, and North-West Airlines withdrew their
services.9
At present Star is the largest alliance in the world. With Varig
Airlines of South America, the Star Alliance accounts for $46
billion in annual revenues, 1450 aircraft, and 232,000 employ-
ees, in addition to smaller carriers that are linked closely with
other Star Alliance partners.10 It seems SIA has left the Delta
Airlines-Continental Airlines Group so it can act as a major hub
in the Asia Pacific Region. The combination of the Star Alliance
partnership with other well established and profitable airlines
such as Lufthansa, SAS in Europe, and now the SIA Group, sug-
gests it has all the hallmarks of a truly global network, serving
Northern Europe, the Asia Pacific region, and North and South
America.'
over Slot Sales, AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 1998, at 2; Tom Gill, BA/American Put Alliance
Brakes On, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 1998, at 1; Alan George Brussels Gears Up to Tackle
Aviation, AIRLINE Bus., Apr. 1999, at 20.
8 See Patrick Hosking, Watchdog to Vet Airline Alliance, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
June 21, 1997, at 97; see also Michael Gilchrist, Ansett Seals Alliance in Battle with
Qantas, AUSTRALIAN, June 21, 1997, at 4; Kevin Morrison, Star May Dim the Ansett
Name, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 30, 1999, at 25; Tom Gill, What's in a Name,
AIRLINE Bus., Nov. 1998, at 36.
9 See Tom Ballantyne, The Primrose Path to LA, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar.
22, 1993, at 11.
10 See Tom Welsh & Richard Whitaker, Together We Stand, AIRLINE Bus., Sept.
1997, at 31.
11 See Nic Hopkins, Singapore Airlines has Eyes for Competitior's Skies, THE AuSTRA-
LIAN, Sept. 12, 1998, at 55; see also Geoffrey Thomas, Air NZ Bid Seen as Bargaining
Ploy, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 5, 1999, at 35. SIA, with cash reserves of $2
billion,is bidding with Germany's Lufthansa to buy into South African Airways,
Thai Airways, and China Air. SIA would not reveal if it would make a stake in
Ansett Airlines by way of taking up News Ltd's 50 percent share. See id.
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IV. THE ANSETT FACTOR: NEW RELATIONSHIPS-THE
POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH IN THE ASIA
PACIFIC REGION
Ansett Australia intends to follow a vigorous growth strategy
in Asia despite its international arm, Ansett International, incur-
ring a $50 million loss for the 1997 financial year. 12 Ansett will
pursue growth by building frequencies to existing destinations
and searching for new opportunities. On June 17, 1997, for ex-
ample, the carrier launched a twice weekly service to Shanghai
with rights to increase the service to six times per week. With
the economies ofJapan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indone-
sia experiencing severe contraction in May 1998, however, An-
sett suspended its flights as new figures pointed to a deepening
slump in Asian tourism to Australia.1 3 Ansett stated that its deci-
sion reflected the worsening economic conditions created by
the Asian currency crisis. Preliminary figures from Australia's
Bureau of Statistics indicate that South-East Asian traffic con-
tracted by twenty-eight percent in the first quarter of 1998, with
Indonesian and Malaysian visitor numbers down fifty-three per-
cent and thirty-one percent respectively. Tourism from Korea,
from which Ansett withdrew its services in Feb. 1998, fell by
eighty-one percent.'4
On June 11, 1998, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) granted approval to Ansett Airlines' com-
mercial alliance with Air NZ and SIA for a period of five years,
acknowledging that while there were anti-competitive aspects to
the alliance, on balance it was likely to have a number of public
12 See Michael Sharp, Ansett: Asia the Key to Overseas Growth, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, June 10, 1997, at 27.
13 See Greg Lenthen, Asian Slump Reduces Flights, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May
6, 1998, at 4.
14 See Fiona Kennedy, Ansett Cuts Jobs, Flights, AUSTRALIAN, May 6, 1998, at 5.
Ansett began a recovery program in October 1997 that resulted in $115 million
in annual cost savings. The program included selling non-performing assets, in-
cluding Hayman Island on Australia's Great Barrier Reef, and the Hamilton Is-
land Airport, closing retail offices, and calling for voluntary redundancies among
its 17,000 person staff. The program will take five years. In the third quarter of
1997, Ansett posted losses of $14 million, even though it is expected to post a full
year operating profit of between $30 million-$40 million. This profit is well be-
low the target set by its Managing Director Rod Eddington. In September 1998,
negotiations began regarding enterprise agreements with trade unions acting for
employees. A one percent pay increase would add between $10 million and $12
million to Ansett's wage bill. See Michael McGuire, Ansett Sticks to Recovery Program,
AUSTRALIAN, July 8, 1998, at 25.
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benefits.15 The weak link in the partnership is Ansett Airlines,
which has experienced four years of consecutive losses despite a
major cash injection of $180 million from Air NZ. Air NZ ac-
quired fifty percent of Ansett Airlines through the purchase of
Trans National Transport's (TNT) half interest in the com-
pany.16 TNT is one of Australia's major international airlines
freight carrier.
The recent approval by the ACCC of this proposed alliance
partnership, with the partner airlines all operating within the
Star Alliance, has the potential to allow creation of the largest
alliance in the Asia Pacific Region, with a combined fleet of 223
aircraft covering 200 cities and 47 countries. 17 The arrange-
ment does not preclude the partners from forming other alli-
ances. SIA, for example, already has separate agreements with
Swiss Air and Delta Airlines. The new agreement has considera-
ble benefits for Ansett Airlines since SIA is seeking an equity
holding in the airline, possibly purchasing some of the News
Corporation stock. It now seems clear that SIA also wants board
control of Ansett 8 Since its launch in May 1997, the Star Alli-
ance has sought to balance the dual development of the global
Star brand and its six individual members' brands. Rupert
Duchesne, Vice President of Air Canada, states that "passengers
want access to a single global network with "as much seamless-
ness as possible, and worldwide status and recognition from all
the partner airlines. The best way to achieve this is with an over-
arching brand."1 9 He also observes that as a result of such rec-
ognition, partners are now sharing terminals and merging key
ticket offices, with Star alliance signage at thirty-five alliance air-
ports worldwide. The objective is that within three years Star
will be the lead brand in third country markets with the goal of
15 See Hosking, supra note 8, at 97; see also Gilchrist, supra note 8, at 4; Nic
Hopkins, Ansett Trio Lift Sights, AUSTRALIAN Sept. 5, 1998, at 54.
16 See id.; see also Kevin Morrison, Ansett in the Black Despite Overseas Losses, SVD-
NEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 4, 1998, at 27; N. Ionides, Ansett Greets Star with Fleet
Upgrade, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1999, at 26; Geoffrey Thomas, Ansett Partners Get the
Wink, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 5, 1999, at 25.
17 See Hosking, supra note 8, at 97; see also Gilchrist, supra note 8, at 4; Hopkins,
supra note 15, at 54.
18 See Hosking, supra note 8, at 97; see also Morrison, supra note 16, at 27. On
Sept. 4, 1998, the airline reported a net profit of $30 million for the year ending
June 1998. See id.; see also Morrison, supra note 8, at 25; lonides, supra note 16, at
26; Geoffrey Thomas, Singapore Airlines Shows Star Quality, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, Apr. 12, 1999, at 35.
19 Jackie Gallacher The Rise of the Global Super Brands, AIRLINE Bus.,Jan. 1999, at
56-58; see also Thomas, supra note 16, at 25.
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completing the global network with check-ins from any airport
in the world.20
V. THE PROPOSED AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA)-BRITISH
AIRWAYS (BA) ALLIANCE
In 1992, American Airlines was the largest airline in the world.
Since that time it has lost market share to United Airlines. The
International Air Transport Association (JATA) stated in 1994
that American Airlines had 672 aircraft, its nearest rival United
Airlines had 536, Delta 551, and British Airways 229.21 Recent
figures indicate, however, that United Airlines ranks ahead of
American Airlines on a range of accepted critical measures.2 2 If
American wishes to become a truly global airline it must seek
additional partnerships. As stated earlier in this article, the pro-
posed alliance between British Airways and American Airlines
still awaits the decision of the UK Monopolies Commission, as
well as the British and US governments, on the conditions
under which the Bilateral Agreement offering Open Skies will
operate. 3
The BA-AA partnership has the potential to not only rival the
Star Alliance but to exceed it in terms of size, revenue and total
employees. 24 Currently its revenues are $45 billion. 25 In addi-
tion to the European Union Commissioner ordering BA and
American to relinquish the 267 weekly slots at London's
Heathrow, the Commissioner has indicated that he will not ap-
prove the United-Lufthansa arrangements without similar
concessions.
In a recent address, Commissioner Van Miert stated that the
Star Alliance was in no way comparable to the BA-AA pact. He
reaffirmed that, "the U.S.-Germany air market is the most
competitive in Europe. [Lufthansa] is in direct competition
with 11 carriers at [its] Frankfurt hub and 50% of German
North Atlantic passengers are using competing non-German
20 See Gallacher, supra note 19, at 58.
21 See JAMES P. HANLON, GLOBAL AIRLINES: COMPETITION IN A TRANSNATIONAL
INDUSTRY 4 (2d ed. 1999).
22 See PAUL S. DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIR TRANSPORTATION: FOUNDA-
TIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 25-27 (1997).
23 See Tom Gill, BA/American Put Alliance Brakes On, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 1998, at
9.
24 See Welsh & Whitaker, supra note 10, at 31.
25 See id.
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gateways to the States. ' 26 Importantly, the group received a ma-
jor victory in the auction for Aerolineas Argentinas that aided
the possible establishment of a tripartite alliance between Amer-
ican Airlines, British Airways and Iberia Airlines. 27 This arrange-
ment was consolidated when Iberia joined oneworld two weeks
after the official launch of the new alliance. 28 The invitation fol-
lowed the agreement of Iberia's terms of sale by Spanish stake
holding company SEPI, under which American Airlines and
British Airways will take 1% and 9% stakes respectively.29 Mean-
while, American Airlines is still awaiting approval for its pro-
posed links with Aeriolineas, Avianca and TAM. The five airline
Taca Group is not included in this analysis, however, because
the Group does not publish revenue numbers, although the rev-
enues are estimated at approximately $400 million. 3 But the
Taca Group should not be overlooked because they are trying to
complete a code-share agreement with American Airlines for
service into Argentina. 31  That agreement would further
strengthen American's strategy of creating a viable global
alliance.
VI. BACKGROUND TO THE ALLIANCES IN 1996-1999
American Airlines represents a powerful ally for British Air-
ways. American's parent company, AMR Corp., was ranked first
in airline operating profits in 1996 with $1.8 billlion. The air-
line also demonstrated the best improvements in net results with
$854 million, and the highest overall net profits of $1.0 billion.
Three other carriers, United Airlines, British Airways, and
Northwest Airlines also achieved operating profits in excess of
$1 billion.32 Overall three-quarters of the top 100 major airlines
earned net profits. The highest revenues were achieved by
26 Taverna, supra note 4, at 36-37. This view may change given the recent ap-
pointment of former Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock as the new European
Union (EU) Transport Commissioner.
27 See Welsh & Whitaker, supra note 10, at 31.
28 See IberiaJoins oneword Alliance, AiRLINE Bus., Mar. 1999, at 19.
29 See id.
30 See Welsh & Whitaker, supra note 10, at 31.
31 It should be noted that Peru signed an Open Skies agreement on May 9,
1998 with Air France and Japan to be phased in over four years starting on June
12, 1998, surpassing Chile in its negotiations with cargo operations and seventh
freedom rights fully liberalised by June 1999. See Karen Walker, Peru Open Skies
First, AiRLINE Bus., June 1998, at 8.




American Airlines with $17. 8 billion. Overall traffic for the
year, however, reflected United Airlines leadership with 23.5 bil-
lion tonne km. United also achieved the largest margin against
other major carriers in passenger km's with 221.9 billion.33
Between October 9 and October 15 of 1997, stock of UAL
Corp, the parent company to United Airlines, gained 5 7/16,
reaching 99 13/16 in heavy trading.34 This result indicates the
strength of the stock as well as United's solid financial base. Yet
there are international carriers performing poorly. Twenty-
seven of the major airlines together lost over $3.5 billion. These
airlines include Alitalia, Swissair, TWA, Sabena, Korean Air, and
Japan Airlines.35
VII. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, DELTA AIRLINES AND
AIR FRANCE
The Continental Airlines - Alitalia Airlines link continues to
expand, yet its codeshare arrangement with Air France faces for-
midable obstacles. Recently the French government agreed on
a twenty percent privatization of Air France.36 In a partial priva-
tization, seventeen percent of the airline will be sold to the pub-
lic with three percent reserved for employees. A further ten
percent will be offered to pilots and managers in exchange for
wage concessions in order to lower costs. The partial sale will be
lucrative since the airline is valued at between Ffr. 20 billion and
Ffr. 27.4 billion making a twenty percent sale worth Ffr. 5.5
billion.
To this extent, Alitalia and Iberia have recently ended discus-
sions on forming an alliance, with Air France pursuing an inter-
est in Continental Airlines. Continental Airlines would in turn
act as a beneficial partner for Air France and its associates. Con-
tinental Airlines has seen its profits rise with earnings up thir-
teen percent in the third quarter of 1996, the best results the
airline has recorded. In 1996, the airline earned $110 million
33 See id.
34 See Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., Market Focus, AviATnON WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct.
20, 1997, at 11.
35 See Welsh & Whitaker, supra note 32, at 29.
36 See Bloomberg, AFP, One-Fifth of Air France up for Sale, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN,
Feb. 25, 1998, at 30; see also Tom Gill, Air France Faces Domestic Challenge, AIRLINE
Bus., Nov. 1998, at 22.
37 See Bloomberg, AFP, supra note 36, at 30. Air France's performance in the
six months prior to September 1997 showed a net profit of Ffr. 1.7 billion an
increase from Ffr. 597 million in the same period a year earlier. See id.
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compared with $18 million in the same period in 1995.38 The
company has been one of the fastest growing airlines among ma-
jor carriers, increasing its capacity 9.7 percent, primarily
through new international routes. It is currently the sixth larg-
est carrier in the United States. In December 1996, Continental
Airlines and Delta Airlines held discussions concerning a
merger. ByJune 1998, Air France and Delta Airlines had begun
codesharing arrangements between Paris/Charles de Gaulle
and New York /John F. Kennedy, as well as U.S. other cities. 9
Since Delta Airlines is the third largest carrier and Continental
Airlines the fifth largest carrier in the United States, together
they would create the world's largest airline.4' At present, the
two airlines carry almost one quarter of all passengers flying on
U.S. airlines. United Airlines, currently the world's largest air-
line, carries twenty-one percent of all industry traffic with reve-
nues in 1997 of $17.8 billion against its nearest rival American
Airlines at $16 billion.41
VIII. ALLIANCES IN CHINA: THE NEW FRONTIER
China is one of the fastest areas of growth in world air trans-
port. Its largest regional carrier, Xiamen Airlines, has formed
links with BA, Lufthansa, Qantas, SIA, Cathay Pacific, and Japan
Airlines.4 2 Cathay Pacific is assisting Xiamen Airlines in develop-
ing the Xiamen Airport, 500 miles south of Shanghai, while BA
has created a joint venture with China Southern Airlines based
in Guangzhou. At the same time, China Eastern Airlines is seek-
ing to acquire an equity holding in China Southern. Lufthansa
Airlines has entered a joint venture with Air China in Beijing,
while Qantas is negotiating with other airlines in Shenzen,
Shanghai, and Yunan.43 Similarly, Ansett Airlines is seeking
links with Air China to ensure an Asian presence following the
38 See New York Times, Delta and Continental in Merger Negotiations, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12 1996, at 26 (discusses the U.S. Department ofJustice's
opposition to the proposed purchase of a fourteen percent interest in Continen-
tal Airlines by Northwest Airlines).
39 See id.
- See id.
41 See Karen Walker, US Majors Aim to Break the Cycle, AIRLINE Bus. Jan. 1999, at
50-52.
42 See J. Burton & P. Hanlon, Airline Alliances: Co-operating to Compete, J. AIR




withdrawal of many of its regional services due to the Asian eco-
nomic crisis.44
Since the recent open skies bilateral agreement between the
United States and Taipei, American Airlines and Continental
Airlines have increased their exposure in China.45 The 1998
agreements provide a codeshare with EVA Airways, frequent
flyer programs on trans-Pacific and domestic US services, as well
as routes from Taiwan to South East Asia. Both American Air-
lines and Continental Airlines plan to use Taipai as a hub for
such flights. These arrangements follow the US government's
approval of agreements between American Airlines and China
Airlines. 46 But based on a competitive analysis of the Asia-Pa-
cific aviation market, it appears that Continental Airlines and
Delta Airlines are at a disadvantage, since United Airlines and
North-West Airlines enjoy fifth freedom rights beyond Japan.47
Cathay Pacific Airlines, which was previously unaligned, re-
cently announced a commercial relationship with oneworld.48
The inclusion of Cathay Pacific is of crucial strategic impor-
tance. With Thai International Airlines and Singapore Airlines
in the Star Alliance there were few choices remaining. One at-
traction of this relationship is the ability to connect traffic
through Hong Kong's new airport, Chek Lap Kok, as a regional
hub. Providing connections for European flights to South East
Asia and Australia was also significant and motive will satisfy in-
vestors. At the same time, since Cathay Pacific provides a major
gateway to the rest of China with its Dragonair affiliates, and
4 See Michael Sharp, Asia the Key to Overseas Growth, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Jun. 10, 1997, at 27; see also Kevin Morrison, Ansett Looks to Air China for Asian
Links, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 6, 1998, at 29.
45 See T. Ballantyne & D. Knibb, SIA Prepares for Stardom. (Singapore International
Airlines), AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 1, 1997, at 1.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See Michael McGuire, Star Pulls Ansett, Air NZ Into its Orbit, WEEKEND AUSTRA-
LIAN, May 16-17, 1998, at 58; see also Kevin Morrison, Ansett Flying Too Low to Meet
Profit Target, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 30, 1998, at 23. Ansett has under-
taken a major strategic review and is aware that it now holds only about forty-
seven percent of the domestic market, down from fifty-five percent six years ago.
See id. Ansett reported an operating profit of (Aust) $28 million in 1997-1998
representing 0.8 percent of the airlines turnover of (Aust) $3.7 billion. See Karen
Morrison, Ansett Prepares to Fly High, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 17, 1998, at
33; WAN, Cathay Loss, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 7, 1998, at 26. In 1998,
Cathay Pacific posted its first loss in 22 years as a public company. It recorded a
net operating loss of $175 million for the six months prior to June 30, 1988,
compared with a $1.06 billion profit for the same period last year. See id.
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China Eastern Airlines a potential new partner, it has the oppor-
tunity of opening up a major route to China's domestic
market.49
IX. ONEWORLD ALLIANCE GROUP
In November 1998, after two years of joint operations, British
Airways signed its pact with American Airlines and announced at
the same time the establishment of the oneworld Alliance. The
partners include Canadian Airlines, Qantas Airways, and Cathay
Pacific.50 A frequent flyer program began in February 1999.
The decision by the oneworld group was timely, given that the
partners in the Star Alliance had been operating successfully for
two years prior to the oneworld announcement. In order to gain
market share, the new alliance needs to reposition its strategy as
a matter of urgency. As Gill observes, the oneworld alliance is a
latent recognition that while rearming to fight the battle in the
Atlantic, they were losing the global marketing war, with twenty-
five percent of gold card club members preferring Star and a
possible migration of their high yield business traffic to the Luf-
thansa Alliance Group.51
On March 1, 1999, Finnairjoined the oneworld alliance along
with its European partners, LOT and Malev, and Spain's Iberia
Airlines, in which BA intends to purchase a ten percent interest.
BA's equity interest in Iberia is tied to a "broad cooperation
agreement" with the objective of saving Ptas 18 billion for the
two companies through lower costs and revenue increases in the
next three years.52
In contrast to the merger with BA, Iberia's alliance with Amer-
ican Airlines, its joint ownership of Aerlinas Argentinas, and
American Airlines's one percent interest in Iberia, are set to re-
main within the framework of oneworld. The marketing agree-
ment signed by the two carriers in May 1998 involves code
49 See McGuire, supra note 48, at 58.
50 See Gill, supra note 8, at 34-36; see also The Guardian, London, BA Puts AA
Link on Hold, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 2, 1998, at 44. The most recent
announcement by BA is that the alliance will now be put on hold and phased in
over a period of four to five years due to the failure of the British and American
authorities to reach an "open skies" agreement. In addition, BA believed it made
more sense to phase in any agreement between US and British authorities to
remove the flight restrictions at Heathrow once the airport's infrastructure can
support more airlines. See id.
51 See Gill, supra note 8, at 34-35.
52 See Tom Gill, Iberia Gets Down to Business, AIRLINE Bus., April 1, 1999, at 68-71.
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sharing between Spain and twenty-two destinations in the
U.S.A., linked frequent flyer programs and cooperation in
cargo, increasing the carrier's revenues by thirty percent on the
jointly operated routes.53 This suggests that the two alliances are
closely matched.
Based on 1997 statistical data, oneworld has a market share of
64.5 percent of international passengers, while the Star Alliance
held 65.6 percent.54 In market share, oneworld held fifteen per-
cent, with the Star Alliance holding fifteen percent.5 5 On poten-
tial world share, however, oneworld is forecast to have twenty-
one percent of the market with the Star Alliance holding twenty
percent.56
X. CONCLUSION
Global alliances are about international airlines reaping econ-
omies of scope by extending their marketing networks through
a range of measures based upon code sharing, franchising,
block spacing, and equity holdings. The strategy aims at forming
alliances with airlines possessing compatible corporate cultures
and sharing a common vision to strive for global goals. The new
aviation markets include South America, with Varig Airlines
seeking to exercise a dominant role, and China, where Cathay
Pacific and China Eastern Airlines dominate. Yet the future re-
mains uncertain in the new millennium. What is clear, however,
is that the dominant carriers, United Airlines, American Air-
lines, British Airways, Delta, Continental, Lufthansa, and Singa-
pore Airlines will continue to assert themselves on a global scale
and the smaller carriers will seek alliances with one or more of
the major groups or risk ultimate demise.
53 See id.
54 See Gill, supra note 8 at 36.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 34-36.
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